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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to the Court's 
Writ of Certiorari and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a), 1953 as amended. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Respondent Utah County concurs, joins and incorporates herein by this reference 
the Issues Presented and Standards of Review contained in the brief of Respondent 
Division of Wildlife Resources. 
2. Whether the Court of appeals correctly ruled that Utah County should recover $10 
for each day the gate remained within the Bennie Creek Road (hereinafter the Road) 
right-of-way after notice was complete, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(4)(b). 
Specifically, this issue is divided into the following sub-issues: 
A. Whether the Court of appeals correctly granted Utah County's 
request to recover $10 for each day the gate remained within the road right-
of-way after notice was complete, because the gate placed by Petitioner's 
across the Road was an "installation" in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 72-
7-104(4)(b) and the award of damages is not discretionary with the court. 
The standard of review for this issue for the court of appeals was 
correctness because this issue is a question of law. Allen v. Hall, 107 P.3d 
85 (Utah Ct. App. 2005). On certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of 
the court of appeals for correctness, not the decision of the trial court. State 
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v. Levin, 2006 UT 50 % 15, 144 P.3d 1096, 1101. 
B. Whether the court of appeals correctly granted Utah County's 
request to recover $10 for each day the gate remained within the Road right-
of-way after notice was complete, because the evidence in the record 
demonstrates that Utah County met its burden of proof on this issue? The 
standard of review for this issue for the court of appeals was clearly 
erroneous because this issue is a question of fact. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 
932, 935 (Utah 1994), AWINC Corp. v. Simonsen, 2005 UT App 168 *{ 7. 
On certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of the court of appeals for 
correctness, not the decision of the trial court. State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50 *f 
15, 144 P.3d 1096, 1101. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1), formerly §27-12-89. "A highway is dedicated and 
abandoned to the use of the public when it has been continuously used as a public 
thoroughfare for a period often years." 
UCA § 72-7-104(l)-(7). See Addendum. 
Utah County Code § 17-3-1-1(a), (b), (c), (d) See Addendum. 
Utah County v. Butler, 2006 UT App 444, 147 P.3d 963 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent Utah County concurs, joins and incorporates herein by this reference 
the Statement of the Case and Statement of Facts contained in Respondent Division of 
Wildlife Resources brief. 
Respondent Utah County adds the following Case and Facts Statement relevant to 
Issue 2 above, the award of $10.00 per day damages for everyday the gate remained in the 
Road. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This matter comes before the Court for a review of the court of appeals decision 
affirming the trial court's determination that the Bennie Creek road is a public 
thoroughfare and that Utah County's is entitled to judgment, joint and several, against 
Randy Butler and Donna Butler (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Butlers") at 
the rate of $10 per day from July 29, 1997 to the date of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Order [August 16, 2004]. 
PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
After eight days of bench trial, the trial court declared that the Bennie Creek road 
is a public road and denied Utah County's request for judgment, joint and several, against 
the Butlers at the rate of $10 per day from July 29, 1997 to the date of the Order [August 
16, 2004] based on the following finding: 
That for some of the time since construction of the metal Butler gate in 
1997 it has been locked and the Road has been obstructed and for some of 
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the time it has not. No evidence was presented to clarify how many of the 
intervening 2,561 days were days when the Road was obstructed and how 
many were not. The Plaintiffs, as the moving party in seeking to obtain the 
penalty, had the burden of providing specific evidence of the number of 
days the Defendants have been in violation. Merely showing initial service 
and testimony that persons were stopped from time to time during the last 6 
or 7 years does not meet that burden. Inasmuch as the Court cannot 
determine with reasonable precision the number of days during which a 
violation of the State statute and County ordinances existed no penalty can 
be imposed. 
Petitioners appealed and the court of appeals affirmed the district courts 
decision declaring the Bennie Creek road to be a public road and granted Utah 
County's cross appeal declaring Utah County is entitled to $10.00 per day for each 
day the gate remained in the road right-of-way. Petitioners were granted certiorari 
by this Court. 
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS 
Prior to July 29, 1997, the Butlers erected a gate across the Road. (R. at 
001645:1074-1075). On July 29, 1997, the Butlers were served with Notices dated July 
18, 1997 which were signed by David J. Gardner, Chairman of the Utah County Board of 
Commissioners, directing them to remove the gate from the Road (hereinafter referred to 
as "Road"). (R. at 001645:1147 and Plaintiffs Exhibit Nos. 73 and 74). See Addendum. 
After the aforementioned Notices were served on the Butlers, they did not remove 
the gate from the Road. (R. at 001645:1147). However, the Butlers did unlock the gate 
across the Road for approximately 30 days in October of 2001 and again unlocked the 
gate from August 20, 2002 to October 24, 2002. (R. at 001647: Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 4). 
4 
See Addendum. On June 14, 2004 during trial, Randy Butler was asked "After you 
received that letter [Notice] did you open the gate?" (R. at 001645:1147). Mr. Butler 
responded "No " (R. at 001645:1147). Mr. Butler was then asked "Is the gate still 
closed today and locked?" (R. at 001645:1147). Mr. Butler responded "Yeah." (R. at 
001645:1147). 
At least 23 witnesses testified at trial that a gate was installed on the Road and 
locked, which prevented access unless they obtained permission from the Butlers (R. at 
001639:19-20, 31, 58, 135, 150-151, 161-162, 165, 167; 001640:203, 208-210, 218, 221, 
224, 227, 237, 240, 247-248, 252, 254-255,261, 266, 279-280, 323, 327, 379, 386-389, 
401-402,418,421-422, 424; 001641:446-447,462-464, 467,478,485, 532, 537-538, 
566; 001642:691). 
The Butlers offered two items to negate the $10 per day penalty. First, counsel for 
the Butlers attempted to introduce into evidence Exhibit No. 83, which was disallowed by 
the trial court. (R. at 001645:1122-1130). 
However, counsel for the Butlers was successful, by stipulation, in introducing into 
evidence Exhibit No. 84 which purports to provide notice of a public hearing held on 
February 11, 2003. (R. at 001645:1126-1128). The "Notice of Public Hearing" provides 
"Notice of Intention of the Board of County Commissioners of Utah County, Utah to 
Amend the Official Map Ordinance of Utah County, Utah, Part A, by Deleting, Adding, 
and Re-aligning Certain Roads and Notice of a Public Hearing to Consider Said 
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Amendment." As it relates to the Road, the "Notice of Public Hearing" provides "Add to 
Road (from 3523 East 16962 South to 1223 East 16043 South) Sec. 20, 21, 22, 26 & 27 
T10SR3E." (R. at 001648:84) 
Randy Butler testified that he attended the February 11, 2003 Utah County 
Commission Meeting and that the Road was discussed. Mr. Butler further testified that 
the Road was not designated as a county road at that meeting. (R. at 001645:1127-1128). 
During closing argument, counsel for the Butlers commented that "the County to date has 
not designated that road as a county road." (R. at 001646:1215). 
Contrasted with the testimony of Randy Butler is the testimony of Clyde Naylor. 
Mr. Naylor testified that he is the County Engineer, County Surveyor, and Public Works 
Director. Mr. Naylor further testified that Utah County has entered into a number of 
agreements with the Forest Service for maintenance of the Road (R. at 001639:86-98; 
Exhibit Nos. 50, 52-58). These agreements with the Forest Service go back to as early as 
January 8, 1974. (R. at 001639:86). Mr. Naylor also testified of a number of general 
highway maps of Utah County depicting the Road as a class D road. (R. at 001639:98-
110, 114; Exhibit Nos. 60, 62-66). These maps go back to as early as 1955. (R. at 
001639:101). 
The second item introduced by the Butlers was Exhibit No. 80-C, which is a 
picture of a sign. Utah County stipulated that it put the sign on the gate. (R. at 
001645:1139-1140; 001648:80-C). The sign reads "Keep Gate Closed Private Property to 
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Forest Service Boundary No Trespassing Off Road." (R. at 001648:80-C) 
During closing argument, the trial court made some very interesting and telling 
statements about the $10 a day penalty. The trial court commented that "Your client was 
served on the 29th of July, 1997. The road has remained obstructed from then until now. 
Just totaling it up it's something like 2,300 days. We're talking $23,400 or something. I 
mean that's - and that's not counting the present year." (R. at 001646:1214). The trial 
court also stated that "the only testimony I have is that from '96 on the gate was locked. I 
know from having supervised this case for a little while that there was a period of time by 
consent when the gate wasn't locked and then it was locked again. I don't know. But 
none of that testimony was presented at trial, so let's stick to the evidence that I heard at 
trial." (R. at 001646:1219). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Respondent Utah County concurs, joins and incorporates herein by this reference 
the Summary of Arguments contained in Respondent Division of Wildlife Resources' 
brief. 
2. Petitioners have failed to marshal the evidence which support the court of appeals 
decision that Respondents' witnesses were members of the public, that no trespassing 
signs posted private property along the Road but not the Road itself and that gates were 
for stock control. Petitioners fail to marshall any of the testimony of more than 40 of 
Respondents' witnesses, several state, Forest Service and other maps (dating from as 
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early as 1955), photographs and other exhibits in evidence showing the Road as a public 
road. Respondents' evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the court of 
appeals decision, establishes that Respondents' witnesses were lawfully using a public 
thoroughfare. 
Despite the fact that Respondents presented evidence of uninterrupted public use 
from the 1920fs through 1997 by 48 witnesses and 75 exhibits, including maps and 48 
photos, Petitioners claim that there was no evidence to marshal in support of the finding 
of continuous use. Petitioners do nothing more than re-argue Petitioners' witnesses' 
testimony which was discredited in the trial court's Memorandum Decision. 
In the face of evidence of continuous uninterrupted public use from the 1920's 
through 1997, Petitioners also complain that a specific ten year time period before 1958 
or after the early 60fs was not identified, yet fail to marshall any evidence which would 
support a finding of continuous use. To attack this finding the Petitioners are required 
and have failed to marshal the evidence to show that there is no evidence before or after 
the identified time periods which would support a finding of continuous public use for 
any ten year period. The failure to identify a time period is, however harmless error and 
not reversible as two ten year periods within a 55 year period of continuous public use 
were identified. 
Petitioners failed to provide a list of evidence supporting the factual findings 
supporting the court of appeals decision and also failed to point out any fatal flaws in the 
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evidence. In this case Petitioners' failure to marshal results in the assumption that the 
record supports the decision of the court of appeals. Petitioners do nothing more than re-
argue the facts which were not credible as outlined in the trial court's Memorandum 
Decision. Because Petitioners failed to marshall the evidence, Petitioners' appeal should 
be dismissed. 
3. Petitioners Butler and Evans did not allege Respondents' witnesses were 
trespassers in their Answer to the Complaint or Amended Complaint as required by the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioners, by failing to assert the trespass arguments in 
the Answer to the Amended Complaint waived this defense. Further, even if not waived, 
Petitioners carried the burden of establishing the claimed trespass arguments as an 
affirmative defense and failed to do so. Requiring a party to establish his own case does 
not shift the burden of proof. 
4. Defendants' arguments in I.C. of Petitioners' Brief contain conclusory statements 
without any supporting case law or analysis and are so inadequately briefed that the court 
should not consider these arguments. The cases cited in support of the contention that 
Plaintiffs had the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that those traveling 
the Road were not trespassers did not address the argument, 
Petitioners' trespass argument is also not relevant. Landowner acquiescence and 
consent are not elements required to find dedication of a public thoroughfare. To engage 
in the examination of whether landowners restricted use of the road invites the Court to 
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inquire into the consent or acquiescence of the landowner which has previously been 
rejected as an element of dedication by use. What is consistent with the ruling that land 
owner consent is not relevant is that trespass does qualify as use within the meaning of 
the dedication by use statute. Only continuous use by the public for ten years results in 
dedication by use, not an occasional trespass. 
Petitioners do not allege any no trespassing signs prior to the late 1950?s or early 
1960fs, leaving 30 years of public use of the Road before landowners posted the property 
adjacent to the road. The public did not trespass when traveling the Road which was 
already established by use. If property owners wrongfully placed gates across the Road 
and posted no trespassing signs in the late 50's or early 60's, it was long after dedication 
by public use. 
5. Utah statutes establish the laws of the State of Utah respecting the subjects to 
which the statutes relate and their provisions and all proceedings under them are to be 
liberally construed with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to promote justice. 
UCA 68-3-2. Accordingly, section 72-5-104 and it's predecessor are to be liberally 
construed to effect the objects of the statute. Rather than being modified by common law, 
the dedication by use statute modifies common law trespass. Following Petitioners' 
logic, anyone who physically invaded the land of another are not members of the public 
for the purpose of dedication by use, rendering the public dedication statute meaningless. 
Such a construction would prohibit 72-5-104 from being construed with the view to effect 
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the objects of the statute. Physical invasion of land is an essential element of the public 
dedication statute. It is not an occasional trespass, but continued public use over the 
required 10 year period of time which ripens into dedication and abandonment of a public 
road. Trespass principles have no application to this case. 
6. The court of appeals correctly determined that the gate was an "installation" in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104, irrespective of whether it was locked or not. 
The term "installation" in Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(4)(b), although not defined, 
includes gates, locked or not, installed within right-of-ways. In this case, Petitioners 
Butler erected a gate across the Road and were served with Notices to remove the gate. It 
is undisputed that the Petitioners did not remove the gate. Furthermore, there is no 
evidence that the Petitioners ever sought or obtained permission from the Utah County 
Commission to erect a gate across the Road, locked or not. As a result, the gate was 
improperly erected across the Road and Respondent Utah County is entitled to the $10 a 
day penally. 
7. The court of appeals correctly held that after Respondent met its burden under 
Utah Code § 72-7-104, the trial court did not have discretion to deny the statutory 
damages. The decision of the court of appeals was a reversal of the trial court decision 
and a remand for a specific calculation of statutory damages under Utah Code Ann. § 72-
7-104. In challenging the court of appeals decision, Petitioners argue that the word "may" 
as used in Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104 is used to give the trial court discretion to deny the 
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statutory damages. 
None of the four uses of the word "may" in Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104, give the 
trial court discretion to deny the statutory damages. Rather, "may" allows the highway 
authority to elect its remedy. The words preceding the word "may" are the key words that 
inform the reader that it is the highway authority which may choose its remedy. There is 
no mention of the Court. It is simply the highway authority's choice. 
Even the title of Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104 describes that statute as the "rights of 
highway authorities." It is the right of the highway authority to elect its remedy to either 
remove the installation or to give notice and collect $10 per day. The title confirms this 
as well as the subsections read in context. 
8. The Petitioners have not briefed nor argued before this court nor before the court 
of appeals that the evidence at trial was insufficient to warrant the statutory damages 
specified in Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104. The failure of Petitioners to respond to 
Respondent's sufficiency of the evidence arguments is a concession by Petitioners that 
there was sufficient evidence produced at trial to warrant the statutory damages of Utah 
Code Ann. §72-7-104. 
9. There is little doubt that the underlying burden of proof on whether the Road has 
been dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public was by clear and convincing 
evidence. However, there is also little doubt that the standard of proof as to Utah 
County's request to recover the $10 per day penalty was preponderance of the evidence. 
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10. The court of appeals correctly determined that the evidence at trial was sufficient 
to warrant the statutory damages specified in Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104. The evidence 
produced at trial was that the Petitioners erected a gate across the Road and were served 
with Notices to remove the gate on July 29, 1997. The Petitioners, after being served 
with the Notices, did not remove the gate from the Road. Furthermore, Petitioner Randy 
Butler testified that after being served the Notice that he did not open the gate and that the 
gate was still closed and locked as of the day he testified. Also, at least 23 witnesses 
testified at trial that a gate was installed on the Road and locked, which prevented access 
unless they obtained permission from Petitioners. The trial court even commented during 
closing argument that "Your client was served on the 29th of July, 1997. The road has 
remained obstructed from then until now. Just totaling it up it's something like 2,300 
days. We're talking $23,400 or something. I mean that's - and that's not counting the 
present year." (R. at 001646:1214). Later during closing argument, the trial court stated 
that "the only testimony I have is that from '96 on the gate was locked. I know from 
having supervised this case for a little while that there was a period of time by consent 
when the gate wasn't locked and then it was locked again. I don't know. But none of 
that testimony was presented at trial, so let's stick to the evidence that I heard at trial." 
(R. at 001646:1219). From the evidence produced at trial, it is clear that Respondent met 
its burden of proof that the gate on the Road was locked from July 29, 1997 through trial. 
The trial court even so commented. 
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There was additional evidence in the record, Exhibit 4, a letter from Randy Butler 
to former Utah County Commissioner Gary L. Herbert, dated December 9, 2002. In that 
letter, Mr. Butler clearly sets forth the periods of time when the gate was unlocked, which 
consisted of approximately 30 days in October 2001 and from August 20, 2002 to 
October 24, 2002 (66 days), for a total of 96 days. There is no additional evidence that 
the gate across the Road was ever unlocked. 
Finally, the two items introduced by the Petitioners consisting of a "Notice of 
Public Hearing" and a sign placed on the gate were deficient to negate the $10 per day 
penalty. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PETITIONERS HAVE FAILED TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE IN THIS 
CASE WHICH SUPPORTS THE COURT OF APPEALS AND TRIAL COURT 
FINDINGS OF CONTINUOUS USE BY THE PUBLIC. 
Petitioners' argue that Respondents' witnesses were trespassers and that 
Respondents' evidence does not support a finding of continuous use. The court of 
appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that Respondents witnesses were members of the 
public and that no trespassing signs posted private property along the Road but not the 
Road itself. (R. 1465, 66) In support of their arguments, Petitioners referenced only 
conflicting evidence and fail to mention that Respondents' remaining 40 plus witnesses 
did not see no trespassing signs and that those cited by Petitioners who did interpreted the 
signs to post property along the Road. 
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Respondents evidence of uninterrupted public use from the 1920's through 1996 by 
48 witnesses, at all seasons, for various reasons and 75 exhibits including 48 photos, state 
and other maps from as early as 1955, rebuts Petitioners claim that there was no evidence 
to marshal in support of the finding of continuous use. None of these witnesses, 
including Petitioner Butler's predecessors in interest, testified that irrigation, bogs or 
springs prevented public use of the Road. No facts were found that support a finding of 
restricted access on the Road. It was ruled that no trespassing signs posted property along 
the Road and that gates were for stock control. 
Petitioners do nothing more than re-argue Petitioners' witnesses' testimony which 
was discredited in the trial court's Memorandum Decision. SeeR. 1463-1470. The 
evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the court of appeals and trial court 
decisions, establish that Respondents' witnesses were members of the public continuously 
using a public thoroughfare. The court of appeals correctly ruled that the trial court's 
findings supported the conclusions of continuous public use of the Road for 70 years. 
Supporting the court of appeals affirming continuous use, the trial court found that 
ten witnesses personally used the Road for recreation in the 1940fs and 50fs, none 
encountered locked gates, sought permission or were prevented from traveling the Road 
and drove vehicles well into Forest Service property. R. 1470. A 1949 aerial photograph 
showed the Road extending from U.S. Highway 89 into the vicinity of the National Forest 
and all of Mr. Butler's predecessors in interest from 1927-1963 (Madge Truman, Virginia 
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Johnson, Shirlene Ottesen) testified the Road was traveled often by the public and no 
attempts were made to restrict or deny public access to the Road. R 1471. 
In the face of overwhelming evidence of continuous uninterrupted public use from 
the 1920's through 1997, Petitioners complain that a specific ten year time period before 
1958 or after the early 60fs was not identified, yet fail to marshall any evidence which 
would support a finding of continuous use. To attack this finding the Petitioners are 
required, and have failed, to marshal the evidence to show that there is no evidence before 
or after the identified time period which would support a finding of continuous public use 
for ten years. As any ten year period between 1920 and 1997 will support the court of 
appeals's decision, Petitioners were required to marshall and show that there was no ten 
year period of continuous public use. In any event, any failure to name a specific 10 year 
period is harmless error and not reversible as the court found at least two ten year periods 
before and after the late 1950?s and early 1960fs within a 55 year span of continuous 
^ — « * * — > 
public use. Defendants also cannot demonstrate that an error, if any was committed, was 
harmful or of such a magnitude that there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome for the Defendants. State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63 f^ 22. 
Petitioners' failure to marshal any evidence in support of the continuous use 
findings is highlighted by the fact that Petitioners' Statement of the Case and Statement of 
Facts are almost identical, commencing not with the facts relevant to this case, but with 
Respondents filing this action and detailing procedural matters concluding with the grant 
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of certiorari. Petitioners' Brief, pp.3-6. 
To challenge factual findings one "must marshal the evidence in support of the 
findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence the trial court's findings are not 
supported by clear and convincing evidence." Young v. Young, 1999 UT38 15, 979 P.2d 
238 (quoting/ft Re State ofBartell 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989)(citations omitted.)). 
To properly marshal the evidence [one] must first list all of the evidence supporting the 
challenged finding. See, e.g., Tingey v. Christensen, 1999 UT 68, f7; 987 P.2d 588. [A 
party] must then show that the marshaled evidence is legally insufficient to support the 
findings when viewing the evidence and inferences in a light most favorable to the 
decision. See Id.... To properly marshal the evidence one must 'show that the findings 
are not supported by clear and convincing evidence... [and] . . . in comprehensive and 
fastidious order, [present] every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which 
supports the very findings the appellant resists. West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 
P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah App. 1991) emphasis added. AWINC Corp. v Sirnonsen, 2005 UT 
App 168^|9, 10. 
Petitioners failed to provide a list of evidence supporting the factual findings relied 
on by the court of appeals and the trial court. See Id., <f 10. Petitioners not only failed to 
provide a comprehensive list of evidence but also failed to point out any fatal flaws in the 
evidence. Id. In this case Petitioners' failure to marshal results in the assumption that the 
record supports the findings of the court of appeals and trial court. Id. 
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When a party fails to marshal the evidence supporting a challenged fact finding, 
[the court] reject[s] the challenge as "nothing more then an attempt to re-argue the case 
before [the appellate] court." PromaxDev. Corp. v. Madsen, 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah 
Court App. 1997), cert denied 943 P.2d 247 (Utah 1997), Campbell v. Box Elder County, 
962 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Because Petitioners failed to marshall the 
evidence, Petitioners' appeal should be dismissed. 
II. IF RELEVANT AND NOT WAIVED, PROOF THAT RESPONDENTS' 
WITNESSES WERE TRESPASSERS IS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE ON 
WHICH PETITIONERS HAVE THE BURDEN OF PROOF. 
Petitioners did not allege Respondents' witnesses were trespassers in their Answer 
to the Complaint or Amended Complaint as required by the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. R. 277, 130. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure require a party to state in 
short and plain terms his defenses to each claim asserted. URCP 8(b). A party is further 
required to set forth affirmatively any matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative 
defense. URCP 8(c). Every defense in law or fact to a claim for relief in any pleading 
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required. URCP 12(b). A 
party waives all defenses and objections not presented either by motion or by answer or 
reply. URCP 12(h). Petitioners failure to assert the trespass arguments in the Answer to 
the Amended Complaint results in a waiver of this defense. 
Petitioners had the burden of establishing the claimed trespass arguments as an 
affirmative defense and failed to do so. As Respondents presented primae facie evidence 
of public and continuous use, that postings and signs restricted access to property along 
the Road, that the Road was used in all seasons and at all times and gates were used for 
stock control, it was the Petitioners that had the burden to show that use was not by the 
public or continuous. Petitioners instead seek to shift their burden of proof to 
Respondents. Requiring a party to establish his own case does not shift the burden of 
proof. Affirmative defenses require the party asserting them to meet the burden of proof 
as to every necessary element. Messickv. PHD Trucking Services, Inc., 615 P.2d 1276, 
1277 (Utah 1980). 
III. PETITIONERS' ARGUMENT THAT RESPONDENTS HAD THE BURDEN OF 
PROOF TO SHOW THEIR WITNESSES WERE NOT TRESPASSERS IS 
MERITLESS 
A. Petitioners' Arguments Are Inadequately Briefed. 
Arguments that contain no meaningful analysis are inadequately briefed and 
should not be considered. See Bernat v. Allphin 2005 UT1, ^ 38, 106 P.3rd 707. 
Petitioners' arguments in I.C. of Petitioner's brief contain conclusory statements without 
any supporting case law or analysis and are so inadequately briefed that the court should 
not consider these arguments. The cases cited in support of the contention that 
Respondents had the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that those 
traveling the Road were not trespassers do not support their argument. The contention 
that the court of appeals and trial court impermissibly relieved Respondents of their 
burden to prove dedication by clear and convincing evidence by not applying trespass 
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principles is not supported by case law and is lacking any legal argument or analysis. 
Petitioners' arguments in section IC of their brief are mere assertions without legal 
support or analysis and should be rejected . 
B. Whether Members of the Public Are Trespassers Is Not Relevant. 
Petitioners' trespass argument is also not relevant as it has been previously decided 
that consent of the land owner is not a relevant issue to dedication of a public 
thoroughfare. Heber City Corp. V. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 311(Utah 1997). What is 
consistent with the ruling that land owner consent is not relevant is that trespass does 
qualify as use within the meaning of the dedication by use statute. Since owner intent is 
irrelevant, whether the Road was posted or whether any of those using the Road were 
trespassers is not relevant. The only issue addressed in the cases cited by Petitioners is 
whether the use was permissive which Petitioners have not asserted. Furthermore, an 
occasional trespass is insufficient to create a public Road. A court can rightly assume that 
a landowner that does not prevent public travel through his property for ten years has 
dedicated and abandoned the way to public use. A land owner that is diligent in 
preventing travel across his property, will prevent a public thoroughfare from being 
created by trespassers. Travel by an occasional trespasser is not sufficient to create a 
public thoroughfare. 
In fact the public did not trespass when traveling the Road which was already 
established by use prior to posting the property adjacent to the Road. If property owners 
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wrongfully placed gates across the Road and posted no trespassing signs in the late 50fs or 
early 60fs, it was long after dedication by public use. However, as found by the court of 
appeals the trial court properly found that posted signs prevented travel off the Road and 
gates were placed to control stock and not restrict Road access. 
C. Petitioners' Trespass Argument is Fatally Flawed. 
Even if Petitioners' arguments regarding trespass were relevant or properly raised, 
Petitioners do not allege any no trespassing signs prior to the latel950^s or early 1960fs. 
leaving 30 years of public use of the Road before landowners posted the property adjacent 
to the Road. Taking the converse of Petitioners' arguments, if seven individuals were 
trespassers because they saw trespass signs and their use could not be public use because 
they were trespassers, the use of the Road from the 1920's to the late 1950fs or early 
1960's would then_be public use as the property was not posted nojrespassing. Public 
access on the Road was also not restricted as signs posted property along the Road and 
gates were for stock control only. 
IV. UCA 72-5-104 IS NOT SUBJECT TO TRESPASS PRINCIPLES. 
At statehood the common law of England so far as it was not repugnant to or in 
conflict with the constitution or laws of the State of Utah was adopted. UCA 68-3-1. The 
rule of the common law that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly 
construed has no application to Utah statutes. Utah statutes and all proceedings under 
them are to be liberally construed with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to 
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promote justice. UCA 68-3-2. UCA 72-5-104 formerly UCA 27-12-89 has remained 
substantially unchanged since first enacted by the territorial legislature in 1886. Lindsay 
Landon Livestock Co. v. Churnos 75 Utah 384, 285 P.2d 646, 648 (Utah 1929). R 1473. 
Section 72-5-104 and it's predecessors are to be liberally construed to effect the objects of 
the statute. Rather than being modified by the common law, the dedication by use statute 
modifies common law trespass. 
Use of the Road as a public thoroughfare for a period often years is the question 
before the court, not whether the public were trespassers. Following Petitioners' logic 
anyone who physically invaded the land of another are not members of the public for the 
purpose of dedication by use, rendering the public dedication statute meaningless. Such 
an interpretation prohibits U.C.A. 72-5-104 from being liberally construed with the view 
to effect the objects of the statute. UCA 68-3-2. Under Petitioners' argument no one 
could be a member of the public under the public dedication statute as the courts have 
previously determined that permissive use of a thoroughfare cannot ripen into a public 
way. To engage in the examination of whether the use of the Road was restricted as 
suggested by Petitioners engages the court in an examination of whether the landowner 
consented or acquiesced in the use which has already been rejected. To the contrary, 
physical invasion of a public thoroughfare is an essential element of the public dedication 
statute. Utah statutes have modified the common law. Trespass principles have no 
application to this case. 
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V. INCORPORATION OF DIVISION OF WILDLIFE RESOURCES BRIEF. 
To the extent not incorporated above, Respondent Utah County adopts, joins in 
concurs with and incorporates herein by this reference all arguments and sections of the 
Respondent Division of Wildlife Resources brief filed in this matter. 
VI. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE GATE 
WAS AN "INSTALLATION" IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-7-
104(4)(b) IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER IT WAS LOCKED OR NOT. 
The court of appeals correctly determined that the gate was an "installation" in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(4)(b) irrespective of whether it was locked or 
not. Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(4)(b) provides that a "highway authority may recover 
$10 for each day the installation remained within the right-of-way after notice was 
complete." (emphasis added). The term "installation" is not defined in the Protection of 
Highways Act, Chapter 7 of Title 72 of the Utah Code. 
However, Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(1) provides some insight as to the meaning 
of the term "installation" as follows: 
If any person, firm, or corporation installs, places, constructs, alters, repairs, 
or maintains any approach road, driveway, pole, pipeline, conduit, sewer, 
ditch, culvert, outdoor advertising sign, or any other structure or object of 
any kind or character within the right-of-way of any highway without 
complying with this title, the highway authority having jurisdiction over the 
right-of-way may: 
(a) remove the installation from the right-of-way or require the person, firm, 
or corporation to remove the installation; or 
(b) give written notice to the person, firm, or corporation to remove the 
installation from the right-of-way. 
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The above subsection is all encompassing and certainly contemplates gates, locked or not, 
installed within right-of-ways. Likewise, the term "installation" in Utah Code Ann. § 72-
7-104(4)(b) would also contemplate gates, locked or not, installed within right-of-ways. 
In this case, Petitioner Randy Butler admits that prior to July 29, 1997, the Butlers 
erected a gate across the Road. (R. at 001645:1074-1075). Mr. Butler also admits that he 
and his wife, Donna Butler were served on July 29, 1997 with Notices dated July 18, 
1997 and signed by David J. Gardner, Chairman of the Utah County Board of 
Commissioners, directing them to remove the gate from the Road. (R. at 001645:1147 
and Plaintiffs Exhibit Nos. 73 and 74.) See Addendum. 
At trial on June 14, 2004, Randy Butler was asked "After you received that letter 
[Notice] did you open the gate?55 (R. at 001645:1147). Mr. Butler responded "No 55 
(R. at 001645:1147). Mr. Butler was then asked "Is the gate still closed today and 
locked?55 (R. at 001645:1147). Mr. Butler responded "Yeah.55 (R. at 001645:1147). 
During closing argument, the trial court commented that "Your client was served on the 
29th of July, 1997. The road has remained obstructed from then until now.55 (R. at 
001646:1214). It is undisputed that after the aforementioned Notices were served on the 
Butlers, they did not remove the gate from the Road. 
A "gate is not allowed on a county road unless authorized by the county executive 
in accordance with the provisions of this section [Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-106].55 Utah 
Code Ann § 72-7-106(5)(a). In other words, a person seeking to install a gate in a right-
24 
of-way must comply with Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-106 by seeking and obtaining the 
permission of the county executive. There is no evidence that the Butlers ever sought or 
obtained permission from the Utah County Commission to erect a gate across the Road, 
locked or not. It is interesting to note that nowhere in the Protection of Highways Act, 
Chapter 7 of Title 72 of the Utah Code, does it provide for the locking of gates on county 
roads. Even if we assume that permission was obtained to erect a gate across the Road, 
that permission would certainly have been terminated by the serving of the 
aforementioned Notices on the Butlers, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-106(5)(b). 
The court of appeals correctly determined that the gate was an "installation" in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(4)(b) irrespective of whether it was locked or 
not, thereby reversing the decision of the trial court. Therefore, the court of appeals 
decision should be upheld and Utah County should be granted judgment in the amount of 
$10 for each day the gate remained within the right-of-way after notice was complete 
from July 29, 1997 to August 16, 2004 [the date of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order] for a total of 2,574 days and $25,740.00. 
VII. THE DISCRETION AFFORDED BY UTAH CODE § 72-7-104 RESTS WITH 
THE HIGHWAY AUTHORITY, NOT THE COURTS. 
The court of appeals correctly held that after Utah County met its burden under 
Utah Code § 72-7-104, the trial court did not have discretion to deny the statutory 
damages. The decision of the court of appeals was a reversal of the trial court decision 
and a remand for a specific calculation of statutory damages under Utah Code Ann. § 72-
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7-104. In challenging the court of appeals decision, Petitioners argue that the word "may" 
as used in Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104 is used to give the trial court discretion to deny the 
statutory damages.1 There are four instances that the word "may" is used in Utah Code 
Ann. § 72-7-104, none of which give the trial court discretion to deny the statutory 
damages. Rather, "may" allows the highway authority to elect its remedy. Petitioners 
will address all four uses of the word "may" in Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104. 
A. Use of the Word "May" in Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(1). 
The first instance of the use of the word "may" in Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104 
occurs in subsection (1), which reads as follows: 
(1) If any person, firm, or corporation installs, places, constructs, alters, 
repairs, or maintains any approach road, driveway, pole, pipeline, conduit, 
sewer, ditch, culvert, outdoor advertising sign, or any other structure or 
object of any kind or character within the right-of-way of any highway 
without complying with this title, the highway authority having 
jurisdiction over the right-of-way may: 
(a) remove the installation from the right-of-way or require 
the person, firm, or corporation to remove the installation; or 
(b) give written notice to the person, firm, or corporation to 
]The issue of discretion was raised by the court of appeals during oral argument. 
The trial court did not deny the statutory damages by exercising its perceived discretion. 
Rather, the trial court denied the statutory damages based on insufficient evidence. 
Petitioners have never argued to uphold the decision of the trial court or reverse the court 
of appeals based on insufficient evidence. The failure of Petitioners to argue 
insufficiency of the evidence is akin to an admission that the evidence was sufficient to 
sustain the statutory damages. Furthermore, Respondent will demonstrate that the 
evidence was sufficient to prove compliance with Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104. See Parts 
IX and X herein. 
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remove the installation from the right-of-way. 
(emphasis added). Subsection (1) is essentially an election of remedies provision which 
gives the highway authority the discretion to either remove the installation, or to give 
notice to the responsible party to remove the installation. The words preceding the word 
"may" which are emphasized above are the key words that inform the reader that it is the 
highway authority which may choose its remedy. There is no mention of the court. It is 
simply the highway authority's choice. 
This is important because both options in Subsection (1) bring a disadvantage. By 
illustration, if the highway authority chooses to simply remove the installation, then the 
highway authority and its agents may be subject to a trespass claim. See Bloomquist v. 
Summit County, 483 P.2d 430 (Utah 1971) (where this Court held that summary judgment 
was inappropriate because of issues of fact, but discussed the possibility that government 
officials may not be protected by immunity from suit when they tear down a gate on a 
private road.). On the other hand, if the highway authority chooses to give proper notice 
to the responsible party and seek relief in court, then the case may drag on for years, like 
in the present case. 
B. Use of the Word "May" in Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(4). 
The second instance of the use of the word "may" in Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104 
occurs in subsection (4), which reads as follows: 
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A highway authority may recover: 
(a) the costs and expenses incurred in removing the 
installation, serving notice, and the costs of a lawsuit if any; 
and 
(b) $10 for each day the installation remained within the right-
of-way after notice was complete. 
(emphasis added). Just like Subsection (1), it is the words preceding the word "may" and 
emphasized above which are the key words that inform the reader of Subsection (4) that it 
is the highway authority which has the discretion to determine its recovery. Again, there 
is no mention of the court. It is simply the highway authority's choice. The use of the 
word "may" also recognizes that if the highway authority chooses the self help provision, 
then the $10 per day would not be available, or that the cost of removing the gate is not 
available if the owner complied with the notice to remove the gate. 
C. Use of the Word "May" in Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(5)(a). 
The third instance of the use of the word "may" in Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104 
occurs in subsection (5)(a), which reads as follows: 
If the person, firm, or corporation disputes or denies the existence, 
placement, construction, or maintenance of the installation, or refuses to 
remove or permit its removal, the highway authority may bring an action 
to abate the installation as a public nuisance. 
(emphasis added). Just like Subsections (1) and (4) above, it is the words preceding the 
word "may" and emphasized above which are the key words that inform the reader that 
Subsection (5)(a) that it is the highway authority which has the discretion to bring an 
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action to abate the installation as a public nuisance. There is no mention of the court. It 
is simply the highway authority's choice. 
D. Use of the Word "May" in Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(5)(b). 
The fourth and final instance of the use of the word "may" in Utah Code Ann. § 
72-7-104 occurs in subsection (5)(b), which reads as follows: 
If the highway authority is granted a judgment, the highway authority may 
recover the costs of having the public nuisance abated as provided in 
Subsection (4). 
(emphasis added). This is the same song and fourth verse. It is the words preceding the 
word "may" and emphasized above which are the key words that inform the reader that 
Subsection (5)(b) that it is the highway authority which has the discretion to recover the 
costs of having the public nuisance abated. There is no mention of the court. It is simply 
the highway authority's choice. 
E. The Title of Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104 Confirms That the Discretion 
Afforded Rests with the Highway Authority, Not the Courts. 
If there is ever a question as to the intent of Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104, one may 
look no further than its title, which states "Installations constructed in violation of rules-
Rights of highway authorities to remove or require removal." (emphasis added). The 
title of Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104 describes that statutes as the "rights of highway 
authorities." That it is the right of the highway authority to elect its remedy to either 
remove the installation or to give notice and collect $10 per day is confirmed by the title 
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as well as the above subsections read in context. 
Therefore, this Court should uphold the decision of the court of appeals, which 
held that after Utah County met its burden under Utah Code § 72-7-104, the trial court did 
not have discretion to deny the statutory damages. Utah County should be granted 
judgment in the amount of $10 for each day the gate remained within the right-of-way 
after notice was complete from July 29, 1997 to August 16, 2004 [the date of the Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order] for a total of 2,574 days and $25,740.00. 
VIII. TO THIS POINT, PETITIONERS HAVE NOT BRIEFED NOR ARGUED THAT 
THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO WARRANT THE 
STATUTORY DAMAGES SPECIFIED IN UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-7-104. 
To this point, the Petitioners have not briefed nor argued before this court nor 
before the court of appeals that the evidence at trial was insufficient to warrant the 
statutory damages specified in Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104. 
"If an appellee fails to respond to an issue in its brief, the court may treat the 
failure to respond as a confession that the appellant's position is correct... or determine 
that the issue has merit." 5 Am Jur. 2d. Appellate Review, §555; See also Nance v. Miami 
Sand & Gravel, LLC, 825 N.E.2d 826 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) ("appellee's failure to 
respond to an issue raised in an appellant's brief is, as to that issue, akin to failing to file a 
brief") The failure to respond to the merits of a controversy can be considered a 
confession of reversible error. See Bulova Watch Co. v. Super CityDept. Stores of Ariz., 
Inc., 4 Ariz.App. 553, 422 P.2d 184 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967). 
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In Utah County's briefs, both before the court of appeals and now this Court, Utah 
County has argued that the evidence produced at trial was sufficient to warrant the 
statutory damages of Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104. Petitioners have not responded and 
now have conceded that there was sufficient evidence produced at trial to warrant the 
statutory damages of Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104. Therefore, this court should uphold 
the decision of the court of appeals, which reversed the decision of the trial court, thereby 
ruling that there was sufficient evidence produced at trial to warrant the statutory 
damages of Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104. 
IX. THE UNDERLYING BURDEN OF PROOF ON WHETHER UTAH COUNTY 
IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER $10 FOR EACH DAY THE GATE REMAINED 
WITHIN THE RIGHT-OF-WAY AFTER NOTICE WAS COMPLETE WAS 
PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE. 
The underlying burden of proof on whether the Road has been dedicated and 
abandoned to the use of the public was by clear and convincing evidence. See Draper 
City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1995). However, "there is 
similarly little doubt that the standard of proof generally applied in civil proceedings is 
the preponderance of the evidence standard." See Hansen v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 931, 935-
6 (Utah Ct. App 1998) {citing Johns v. Shulsen, 111 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1986) ("It is 
universally recognized that the standard of proof in civil actions is by a preponderance of 
the evidence."); Lipman v. Industrial Comm% 592 P.2d 616, 618 (Utah 1979) (noting 
preponderance is "usual standard of proof... used in most civil actions"); Morris v. 
Farmers Home Mut Ins. Co., 28 Utah 2d 206, 500 P.2d 505, 507 (1972) (stating 
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preponderance is "universally recognized standard of proof required to establish facts in a 
civil ease")). This usual standard of proof of a preponderance of evidence applies to Utah 
County's request to recover $10 for each day the gate remained within the right-of-way 
after notice was complete, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(4)(b). 
X. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE 
EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT THE 
STATUTORY DAMAGES SPECIFIED IN UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-7-104. 
The court of appeals correctly determined that the evidence at trial was sufficient 
to warrant the statutory damages specified in Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104. The evidence 
produced at trial was that prior to July 295 1997, the Butlers erected a gate across the 
Road. (R. At 001645:1074-1075). On July 29, 1997 the Butlers were served with 
Notices dated July 18, 1997 and signed by David J. Gardner, Chairman of the Utah 
County Board of Commissioners, directing them to remove the gate from the Road. (R. 
At 001645:1147 and Plaintiffs Exhibit Nos. 73 and 74.) 
After the aforementioned Notices were served on the Butlers, they did not remove 
the gate from the Road. (R. at 001645:1147). On June 14, 2004 during trial, Randy 
Butler was asked "After you received that letter [Notice] did you open the gate?" (R. at 
001645:1147). Randy Butler responded "No...." (R. at 001645:1147). Mr. Butler was 
then asked "Is the gate still closed today and locked?'5 (R. at 001645:1147). Randy 
responded "Yeah." (R. at 001645:1147). 
At least 23 witnesses testified that Butler's gate was installed on the Road and 
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prevented access unless they obtained permission from the Butlers (R. at 001639:19-20, 
31, 58, 135, 150-151, 161-162, 165, 167; 001640:203, 208-210, 218, 221, 224, 227, 237, 
240, 247-248, 252, 254-255, 261, 266, 279-280, 323, 327, 379, 386-389, 401-402, 418, 
421-422, 424; 001641:446-447, 462-464, 467, 478, 485, 532, 537-538, 566; 001642:691). 
During closing argument, the trial court commented that "Your client was served 
on the 29th of July, 1997. The road has remained obstructed from then until now. Just 
totaling it up it's something like 2,300 days. We're talking $23,400 or something. I mean 
that's - and that's not counting the present year." (R. at 001646:1214). Later during 
closing argument, the trial court stated that "the only testimony I have is that from '96 on 
the gate was locked. I know from having supervised this case for a little while that there 
was a period of time by consent when the gate wasn't locked and then it was locked 
again. I don't know. But none of that testimony was presented at trial, so let's stick to 
the evidence that I heard at trial." (R. at 001646:1219). 
Furthermore, there was additional evidence in the record, such as a letter from 
Randy Butler to former Utah County Commissioner Gary L. Herbert, dated December 9, 
2002, in which Mr. Butler set forth with reasonable precision the amount of days that he 
left the gate unlocked. (R. at 001647: Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 4). In that letter, Mr. Butler 
states that "in October of 2001, we agreed to allow access for the hunts. That fall Utah 
County put up a sign on the gate that stated it was private property to the U.S. Forest 
Service Land. We left the gate unlocked for approximately 30 days We locked the 
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gate again until August 20, 2002 without incident Consequently, I locked the gate on 
October 24, 2002, and as of December 1, 2002, there has not been any problem." (R. at 
001647: Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 4). 
The only evidence to the contrary offered by Respondents was the "Notice of 
Public Hearing" and a sign placed on the gate across the Road by Utah County as part of 
a temporary settlement proposal in October of 2001 and discussed in the previous 
paragraph. However, those two items were deficient to negate the $10 per day penalty 
proscribed in Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104. 
The first item presented by the Respondents was Exhibit No. 83, which was 
disallowed by the trial court. (R. at 001645:1122-1130). However, Respondents, by 
stipulation, introduced Exhibit No. 84 into evidence which purports to provide notice of a 
public hearing held on February 11, 2003. (R. at 001645:1126-1128). The "Notice of 
Public Hearing" provides "Notice of Intention of the Board of County Commissioners of 
Utah County, Utah to Amend the Official Map Ordinance of Utah County, Utah, Part A, 
by Deleting, Adding, and Re-aligning Certain Roads and Notice of a Public Hearing to 
Consider Said Amendment." As it relates to the Road, the "Notice of Public Hearing" 
provides "Add to Bennie Creek Road (from 3523 East 16962 South to 1223 East 16043 
South) Sec. 20, 21, 22, 26 & 27 T10S R3E" as a class "B" county road. (R. at 001648:84) 
Randy Butler testified that he attended that February 11, 2003 Utah County 
Commission Meeting and that the Road was discussed. Mr. Butler further testified that 
34 
the Road was not designated as a county road at that meeting. (R. at 001645:1127-1128). 
During closing argument, counsel for the Butlers commented that "the County to date has 
not designated that road as a county road." (R. at 001646:1215). 
Contrasted with the testimony of Randy Butler is the testimony of Clyde Naylor. 
Mr. Naylor testified that he is the County Engineer, County Surveyor, and Public Works 
Director. Mr. Naylor further testified that Utah County has entered into a number of 
agreements with the Forest Service for maintenance of the Road (R. at 001639:86-98; 
Exhibit Nos. 50, 52-58). These agreements with the Forest Service go back to as early as 
January 8, 1974. (R. at 001639:86). Mr. Naylor also testified of a number of general 
highway maps of Utah County depicting the Road as a class D road. (R. at 001639:98-
110, 114; Exhibit Nos. 60, 62-66). These maps go back to as early as 1955. (R. at 
001639:101). 
As a result of the testimony of Clyde Naylor, it is evident that Utah County has 
considered the Road as a class D county road since at least as early as 1955. In each of 
the aforementioned maps and agreements, the Road is so designated as a class D county 
road. Clearly, the weight of evidence demonstrates that Utah County has so designated 
the Road as a class D county road. 
The second item introduced by the Respondents was Exhibit No. 80-C, which was 
a picture of a sign. Utah County stipulated that it put the sign on the closed gate. (R. at 
001645:1139-1140; 001648:80-C). The sign reads "Keep Gate Closed Private Property to 
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Forest Service Boundary No Trespassing Off Road." (R. at 001648:80-C). Utah County 
merely installed this sign to be a good neighbor, to instruct the public to stay on the Road, 
and as part of a temporary settlement to allow hunters to use the Road in October of 2001 
following the TRO hearing. 
Neither the "Notice of Public Hearing" nor the sign are evidence that the Road is a 
private road. Likewise, neither the "Notice of Public Hearing" nor the sign are evidence 
that Utah County allowed the Respondents to install a gate across the Road. Therefore, 
the trial court properly ignored these two items offered by the Petitioners. 
Respondents can point to no other evidence to the contrary because there is none. 
The trial court even so commented when it said "the only testimony I have is that from 
'96 on the gate was locked. I know from having supervised this case for a little while that 
there was a period of time by consent when the gate wasn't locked and then it was locked 
again. I don't know. But none of that testimony was presented at trial, so let's stick to 
the evidence that I heard at trial." R. at 001646:1219). Petitioners' evidence does not 
rebut Utah County's evidence entitling Utah County to the statutory damages. 
Therefore, this court should uphold the decision of the court of appeals that the 
evidence at trial was sufficient to warrant the statutory damages specified in Utah Code 
Ann. § 72-7-104, thereby reversing the decision of the trial court. As a result, Utah 
County should be granted judgment in the amount of $10 for each day the gate remained 
within the right-of-way after notice was complete from July 29, 1997 to August 16, 2004 
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[the date of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order] for a total of 2,574 days 
and $25,740.00 or in the alternative subtract 94 days for the time the gate was unlocked in 
October 2001, and from August 20, 2002 to October 24, 2002 and adjust the judgment 
accordingly. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the forgoing, and on the brief of Respondent State of Utah, Division of 
Wildlife Resources, Respondent Utah County respectfully requests: 
1. That the Court uphold the decision of the court of appeals affirming the trial 
court's determination that the Road is a public thoroughfare having been continuously 
used by the public for a period often years and dismiss Petitioners' appeal, 
2. That the Court affirm the court of appeals decision ordering that on remand 
Utah County is entitled to judgement against Petitioners Butler for statutory damages of 
$10.00 for each day that the gate remained in the Road right of way after service of the 
Notice to remove the same, or in the alternative, for $10.00 for each day the gate 
remained locked across the Bennie Creek Road after service of the Notice to remove the 
same. 
3. For Plaintiffs costs incurred in this matter including costs on appeal. 
4. For such further relief as is just and equitable in the premises. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s ^ ^ day of June, 2007. 
M. CORT GRIFFIN 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
ROBERT J^MOORE 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF, on this ^ £ d a y of June, 2007, to the following: 
SCOTT L. WIGGINS 
Arnold & Wiggins, P.C. 
57 West 200 South #105 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
MARTIN B. BUSHMAN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Utah Attorney General's Office 
1594 West North Temple, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
^XzMjbWi L l'Mt.d&v 
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ADDENDUM 
72-7-104. Installations constructed in violation of rules - Rights of highway 
authorities to remove or require removal. 
(1) If any person, firm, or corporation installs, places, constructs, alters, repairs, 
or maintains any approach road, driveway, pole, pipeline, conduit, sewer, ditch, culvert, 
outdoor advertising sign, or any other structure or object of any kind or character within 
the right-of-way of any highway without complying with this title, the highway authority 
having jurisdiction over the right-of-way may: 
(a) remove the installation from the right-of-way or require the person, 
firm, or corporation to remove the installation; or 
(b) give written notice to the person, firm, or corporation to remove the 
installation from the right-of-way. 
(2) Notice under Subsection (l)(b) may be served by: 
(a) personal service; or 
(b) (i) mailing the notice to the person, firm, or corporation by certified 
mail; and 
(ii) posting a copy on the installation for ten days. 
(3) If the installation is not removed within ten days after the notice is 
complete, the highway authority may remove the installation at the expense of the person, 
firm, or corporation. 
(4) A highway authority may recover: 
(a) The costs and expense incurred in removing the installation, serving 
notice, and the costs of a lawsuit if any; and 
(b) $10 for each day the installation remained within the right-of-way 
after notice was complete. 
(5) (a) If the person, firm, or corporation disputes or denies the existence, 
placement, construction, or maintenance of the installation, or refuses to 
remove or permit its removal, the highway authority may bring an action to 
abate the installation as a public nuisance. 
(b) If the highway authority is granted a judgment, the highway authority 
may recover the costs of having the public nuisance abated as provided in 
Subsection (4). 
(6) The department, its agents, or employees, if acting in good faith, incur no 
liability for causing removal of an installation within a right-of-way of a highway as 
provided in this section. 
(7) The actions of the department under this section are not subject to the 
provisions of Title 63, Chapter 46b, the Administrative Procedures Act. 
17-3-1-1. Enforcement 
If any person places, constructs, or maintains any approach road, driveway, pole, 
pipeline, conduit, sewer, ditch, culvert, billboard, advertising sign, or any other structure 
or object of any kind of character within the right-of-way of any county road, without first 
obtaining permission from the Board of County Commissioners, the Commissioners may: 
(a) remove such installation from the right-of-way or require such person to 
remove the same; or 
(b) give written notice to such person to remove such installation from the 
right-of-way; such notice may be served either by personal service or by 
mailing the notice to the person by registered mail and posting a copy 
thereof on such installation for a period often (10) days; and if such 
installation is not removed within ten (10) days after the notice is complete, 
the Commission may remove the same at the expense of the person and 
recover costs and expenses, and also the sum often dollars ($10.00) for 
each day the same remained within the right-of-way after notice was 
complete, in an action for that purpose; or, 
(c) if such person disputes or denies the existence of such installation, or 
refuses to remove or permit its removal, the Commission may bring an 
action to abate the same as a nuisance; and if judgment is recovered, in 
addition to having the same abated, the costs of action and the sum often 
dollars ($10.00) for every day such nuisance remained within the right-of-
way after notice was given for its removal in the manner provided in 
Subsection (b) of this Section. 
Deceaiber 9# 2002 
TO: Cgtardssioner Herbert 
FROM: Randy Butler & Blaine Evans 
BE: Bennie Cre^k Road 
Gary, the following i s a chronoi 
occurred; I appreciate y o u r ^ m ^ ^ f ° f ? * * 0 f t h e P ^ 1 ^ « a t have 
J ui. wixiingness to review this matter. 
?roca 1987 to 1993, ve bad 7 catti T^ 
I occasions and our badkhoe tekS^-^' 2. C a l v e s s t o l e n ' our truck taken on 
?laces and at msterous times. l^?*^!***** ^ ^ ^ ^ cut in numrous 
^eing irrigated, c r e a t i n g ^ ^3£%£L1Ve t * r o u 9 h « » pastures vhile they are 
iave been cut on the gates i e a d i ^ S f ° r e a t e e r o s i o n - * » locks or chains 
^ e of these i n d i v i d u a l s l n d ^ e ^ ^ ^aJ***™*5 ° ° 4 occasions. 1 caugtt 
to he had to pass 4 p r i v a t e ^ r S i l ^ d l ? V f c ^ ^ w s private property^ 
* * the chain to get a S S V ^ r e ^ v a s ^ * * t r e s p a s s i n 3 B i ^ a n l ^ d to 
He've had people cocoa at-3*oo 
^ ^ b i l e s up and down t h e ^ ^ a i i ^ ^ fSxLia <** f r o n t * « * "* « * * 
ki l led i t and never l e f t V o ^ ^ S ^ ^ ***** * C ° * g a r ' « * * * *< 
DuMng this time, there ver* ,*m„. .., 
a ^ o r alcohol party e l l ^ c ^ ^ S E ? ^ ^ t h a t « " * * « * * drug 
He could not l e t our own c h i M r e n ^ S ^ ST*** p r c P e r t y or on the U.S. Fores?. 
oouldhappan. Tfe vouid p ^ ^ ^ ^ o w ? ^ P^P^rty for fear of vhat 
mattresses after they vould l ^ v e ! ^ syringes, clothing and even 
in 1993 , ve started resfrir*Mv^ 
roaa. « »
 a ^ f o c 2 ^ ^ ! ? ^ * * * * * « P e « l a sign across the 
««a rinai iy the gate that presently ex i s t s . 
Prom 1994 to 2001, v e rea^rw, , _ _ , 
^ r i n g th i s t fae , v e ^ v ^ ^ E ^ L ^ ^ P ^ ^ s s i o n s l i p s to gain access, 
through our backyard. O n T i S ^ S S ? ? 6 3 ***** V**1* v o u l < a t ry to drive-
called the sheriff but m c ^ f S e ^ S i S l L 0 7 ^ TO ^ r f ^ - e r pipes. * ? 
C l o n e d to you. About a to.^t^^^* ? ? * > tea «»e incident I 
*
 K e n t r e r a o a
 threatening my v i f e ' s l i f e . 
G**ity put % a ri^^^S S ^ J S S f * ? * fchfi l a m t e - ^ f a l 1 Utah 
U.S. Forest Servici Land, w f S f F ? ^ ? * i f c TO p r i v a t e P " * * * * to the 
in -which time, ve had t h r e e d i f f l r p ^ ? ^ u n l o c 3 ^ * * approximately 30 days, 
and 2 on the Evans' P r o S y . £ f g £ H S * l n ? * P * 8 * * 6 3 t h a f c TO « « # * 
cases, we loCed the gate ^ ^ J — ^ S S S f i S K * * -
Since august 20, 2002, the f < ^ f ^ / S S ^ S S ^ ^ d « * ^ S " 
vhiie the gate i s unlocked. The gate b e ^ q ^ * £ % mile north of the Forest Service "has been lef t open twice. Ttd£ ^ * « ^ » ^
 f e n c e between the itennie Creek Road and i t has never teen a T f ^ j J ^ f c ' ^ the gate lef t open 
lean 's Property and the U.S. Forest Servxce has been cut ana 
in the same area. 
Countless people have ridden ATV's f ^ ^ ^ ^ g f { £ * £ % o n i o n s , 
S S e r t y , SKch vould be fine except ve get the blaa-for " ^
 i t l our 
S S , been people on W e ^ ^ J ^ S S * l aw^force^n t and 
pastures. We have caught people trespassing twice, cax 
"had ho response 
on vw occasions, the signs on the gates a h » « « t ? f p ^ t e T S S t Y ei^ 
^ ^ a t e l y • 75 feet from our hoc* vere shot again. 
*>A nnrrt nnd a s Of December 1 / 2 0 0 2
 f 
Consequently, I ***ed the gate on ^ ^ ^ ^ i L s for «*b of these 
there has not been any problem. 1 also have oases auu 
occurrences i f "they are needed. 
trteiik You 
P-S;. TrJbuld you please l e t ine lcriw of the financial feasibili ty concerning this 
matter K&.K.V.. Rlso I have enclosed a l i s t of additional stipulations that 
should help Vith the problems ve discussed the other day. 
Respectfully, 
Blaine Evans 
cc: 
Mark Arnold 
STIPOIATIONS 
# 2. 
#3. 
# 4 . 
# 5 
«hen C-pro^tfo^?^ S ^ P 9 r t i e s « * « » * < * « « vandalism, 
tftah Countv S h ^ ^ f £ L f S : f o r a ^esP^ss or a vandalism violation, the 
^ e ^ ^ ^ o ^ ? ? ! ^ 1 1 , 1 1 1 3 ^ 1 1 a * ^ toi&Je over Thistle Creek. 
a S S £ * £ S r S i ^ ^ . 0 * ' d e s i 9 ^ for large f i re trucks. If ve 
^ ^ g S ^ S £ P ^ ^ ^ ^ t y r o a d f r c m H ^ t o 
p r o b S T ^ t ^ S S S d 8 ^ : ^ S ^ d ** « « to rtop the S s t 
need to grade a n ^ S S a g . ^ S ^ t * * ** t C a £ f i c * * to e l l M n a t e t t e 
area to ttS ^ U C ^ E S ^ S V ^ ^ ^ 2 ^ t e i n * * * * I o a f e r l f o u a t a i n 
gas l ine r o a d / £ v e U ^ ^ ^ J ? 3 * 2 ^ ^ ^  « * S a l t a * * * « 
*ould equally o a s t r i S L ^ ^ S f ° ^  a n d Covered Bridge roads. Ibis 
Bennie Creek. Q i S t r x b u t e ^ ^ Publics use and not concentrate i t only to 
* Of-Way. E S ^ e e t f r o ^ T , ? t m3^11 a f e n c e m ^ s i d e s o f t t e Bitf*-
private p r S e r t ^ ^ f f ^ ? ^ ^ ° f *** r oa<a ^ « * W ^ ° ^ tte 
a i s S L S ^ e S ; f r ^ S t S S 5 T * ^ * * ^ « * M * W t f - * y and should 
fence J l t U ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ * ' M s ° ' U t a h ^ ^ * * * * * * * * * * *aid 
o ? n ^ ? 2 S S ^ X " * ^ ^ a t l e a s t « surveillance camera at 
£Slf~^^^-^^^rat"^ SSIS^s1 ss :r^w^^ s 
vi th in60 S B ^ ^ I ^ S S J ^ r e i ? u 5 s e a «*r f a i r • « * « * value as such-
vandalism. o r ^ ^ c ^ locac the gate to eliminate the risk of additional 
&&H!^££5!££& S£* ^  *»* as negotiated * *** 
oSscrltiot^ihS^0^3' t h e ^  u s e ^  te a t t t e defendants 
t h ^ v o ^ S ^ t T L v e h a r v ^ S t f *"** * * ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ° f " * * " 
( O i ^ d s e ^ S e f ^ l ; t h S a3feemen t ' «hey should loose their Right-Of-% 
^otuerwise, they would have no incentive to abide by th i s agreement). 
Bridge's and a l l w u s t o ^ t > ^ ^ ° ! ^ to P^t in a gate similar to Cover* 
cos t fas has S S T t t a ^ S ^ ^ S f ^ ^ ™ < ^ ^ ^ P ^ g c 
reh i red , graded « o t h e r S e ^ ^ ^ ^ 
#7, 
#8 
#'9 
£10. 
#11. 
#12 
Respectfully, 
** NOTICE ** 
TO: Randy Butler 
Donna Butler 
2721 East 17050 South 
Birdseye, UT 84629 
DATE: July 18,1997 
Pursuant to Utah County Ordinance 17-3-1-1 and Utah Code Annotated 27-12-135, a person 
may not place, construct or maintain any pole or any other structure or object of any kind or 
character within the right-of-way of any County road or highway without the permission of the 
Board of Utah County Commissioners. You have, without the pemiission of the Utah County Board 
of Commissioners, placed a gate across the Bennie Creek Road, which is a County road under Utah 
County Ordinance 17-1-1. 
You are hereby given notice to remove from the Bennie Creek Road any and all poles, 
structures or objects of any kind or character placed, constructed or maintained by you within the 
right-of-way of the Bennie Creek Road, including, but not limited to, any gates placed thereon by 
you. 
If, within ten(10) days of service of this notice on you, you fail to remove from the Bennie 
Creek Road any and all gates, poles, structures or objects of emy kind or character placed, 
constructed or maintained by you within the Bennie Creek Road right-of-way, the Utah County 
Commission may remove the same at your expense and recover costs and expenses from you 
including the sum of $10.00 for each day the same remains within the Bennie Creek Road right-of-
way after this notice was served upon you or bring an action to abate the same as a nuisance. If 
judgement is recovered by the Commission, the Commission may also recover in the addition to 
having the same abated the costs of action and the sum of $10.00 for every day such nuisance 
remained in the Bennie Creek Road right-of-way after service of this notice upon you. 
Govern yourself accordingly. 
David J. Gardner, Chairman, 
Utah County Board of Commissioners 
MCG:tae 
UJCO*T\r3U^K*BTLMWT 
DOCKET NUMBER: CV-97-2510 PROCESS: NOTICE 
PLAINTIFF: UTAH COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
VS 
DEFENDANT: BUTLER, RANDY 
ATTORNEY: UTAH COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
COURT: COURT IS NOT NEED DEPUTY: RICHARD CASE 
DATE RECEIVED: 7/22/1997 TIME ENTERED: 1043 
CHARGE DESCRIPTION AMOUNT PAID 
TOTAL: 0.00 
HOME ADDRESS: 2721 E 17050 SOUTH 
BIRDS EYE UT 84629 
DATE SERVED: 7/29/1997 TIME SERVED: 17:30 ATTEMPTS TO SERVE: 
DATE RETURNED: 7/30/1997 
COMMENTS: DO NOT POST! 
SERVED HEIDI BUTLER/DAUGHTER 
* * * * * CHECK FOR POSSIBLE WARRANT 
* * * * 
RETURN OF SERVICE 
TATE OF UTAH / COUNTY OF UTAH } S.S. SHERIFF'S OFFICE 
:KET NUMBER: CV-97-2510 
IVED: BUTLER, RANDY DEFENDANT 
TE RECEIVED: 7/22/1997 DATE SERVED: 7/29/1997 
OCESS: NOTICE 
rPE OF SERVICE: OTHER 
3FT AT RESIDENCE WITH: HEIDI BUTLER 
IS/HER RELATIONSHIP IS: DAUGHTER 
ND THIS IS HIS/HER PLACE OF ABODE AND IS OF SUITABLE AGE AND DISCRETION, 
ERVICE ADDRESS: 2721 E 17050 SOUTH 
CITY: BIRDSEYE STATE: UT 
r FURTHER CERTIFY THAT AT THE TIME OF SERVICE, ON COPY SERVED, 
I ENDORSED THE DATE, SIGNED MY NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE THERETO. 
SHERIFF'S FEES 
TOTAL 0.00 
DAVID R. BATEMAN, SHERIFF OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
I CERTIFY THAT THE FORGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT 
AND THAT THIS CERTIFICATE IS EXECUTED ON 
n c i 
(BEPUTT SHERIFF) RICHARD CASE 
** NOTICE ** 
TO: Randy Butler 
Donna Butler 
2721 East 17050 South 
Birdseye, UT 84629 
DATE: July 18,1997 
Pursuant to Utah County Ordinance 17-3-1-1 and Utah Code Annotated 27-12-135, a person 
may not place, construct or maintain any pole or any other structure or object of any kind or 
character within the right-of-way of any County road or highway without the permission of the 
Board of Utah County Commissioners. You have, without the permission of the Utah County Board 
of Commissioners, placed a gate across the Bennie Creek Road, which is a County road under Utah 
County Ordinance 17-1-1. 
You are hereby given notice to remove from the Bennie Creek Road any and all poles, 
structures or objects of any kind or character placed, constructed or maintained by you within the 
right-of-way of the Bennie Creek Road, including, but not limited to, any gates placed thereon by 
you. 
If, within ten(10) days of service of this notice on you, you fail to remove from the Bennie 
Creek Road any and all gates, poles, structures or objects of any kind or character placed, 
constructed or maintained by you within the Bennie Creek Road right-of-way, the Utah County 
Commission may remove the same at your expense and recover costs and expenses from you 
including the sum of $10.00 for each day the same remains within the Bennie Creek Road right-of-
way after this notice was served upon you or bring an action to abate the same as a nuisance. If 
judgement is recovered by the Commission, the Commission may also recover in the addition to 
having the same abated the costs of action and the sum of $10.00 for every day such nuisance 
remained in the Bennie Creek Road right-of-way after service of this notice upon you. 
Govern yourself accordingly. 
David J. Gardner, Chairman, 
Utah County Board of Commissioners 
MCG:tae 
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DOCKET 'NUMBER: CV-97-2511 PROCESS: NOTICE 
PLAINTIFF: UTAH COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
VS 
DEFENDANT: BUTLER, DONNA 
ATTORNEY: UTAH COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
COURT: COURT IS NOT NEED DEPUTY: RICHARD CASE 
DATE RECEIVED: 7/22/1997 TIME ENTERED: 1043 
CHARGE DESCRIPTION AMOUNT PAID 
TOTAL: 0.00 
HOME ADDRESS: 2721 E 17050 SOUTH 
BIRDSEYE UT 84629 
DATE SERVED: 7/29/1997 TIME SERVED: 17:30 ATTEMPTS TO SERVE: 1 
DATE RETURNED: 7/30/1997 
COMMENTS: DO NOT POST! 
SERVED HEIDI BUTLER/DAUGHTER 
* * * * * CHECK FOR POSSIBLE WARRANT * * * * * 
STATE OF UTAH / COUNTY OF UTAH } S.S. SHERIFF'S OFFICE 
DOCKET NUMBER: CV-97-2511 
SERVED: BUTLER, DONNA DEFENDANT 
DATE RECEIVED: 7/22/1997 DATE SERVED: 7/29/1997 
PROCESS: NOTICE 
TYPE OF SERVICE: OTHER 
LEFT AT RESIDENCE WITH: HEIDI BUTLER 
HIS/HER RELATIONSHIP IS: DAUGHTER 
AND THIS IS HIS/HER PLACE OF ABODE AND IS OF SUITABLE AGE AND DISCRETION. 
SERVICE ADDRESS: 2721 E 17050 SOUTH 
CITY: BIRDSEYE STATE: UT 
I FURTHER CERTIFY THAT AT THE TIME OF SERVICE, ON COPY SERVED, 
I ENDORSED THE DATE, SIGNED MY NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE THERETO. 
SHERIFF'S FEES 
TOTAL 0.00 
DAVID R. BATEMAN, SHERIFF OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
I CERTIFY THAT THE FORGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT 
AND THAT THIS CERTIFICATE IS EXECUTED ON 
DATE 7/3 0/1997 BY r / / X f M . I LXjA CL> 
RICHARD CASE 
